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            Abstract 
Stress testing has become an essential and very prominent tool in 
the analysis of financial sector stability and development of financial 
sector policy. Starting with  2010  stress test led by the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), and reinforced by 2011 stress 
test and the bank recapitalization exercise led by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), the output of EU wide stress tests has been viewed as 
essential information on the health of the system. 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the main elements 
considered by the EBA and European Central Bank (ECB) in creating the 
model of the stress test. At the same time it will highlight how the recent 
financial crisis has influenced the introduction of these decisions in order 
to stabilize the banking system. The vision of a future banking union will 
reshape and resize the entire European system profile. Applying stress 
test will lead to a healthy and robust banking system even if a new 
potential crises will come. 
Keywords: Banking Union, Stress test, financial crisis, challenge, Basel 
philosophy 
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         Introduction 
 
               The stress test has become topic of interest in recent years, the 
literature being in a continuous development. The stress tests were 
perceived as a consistent model due to the recent worldwide crisis which 
generated bankruptcies in the bank field.  Due to the fact that stress tests 
refer to adverse macroeconomic scenarios, gives them a special 
importance in the evaluation of a global, systemic risk. Their results may 
represent a foundation for the development of the norms and prudential 
control instruments, both for the supervision national authorities and for 
the international organisms, recently constituted. 
The paper describes the main elements of a stress test applied to 
the most important bank groups from the Euro Zone. It identifies the 
main endogenous and exogenous factors considered in the creation of the 
adverse scenario and of the tested variables.   
The result indicates the fact that the 124 banks considered 
systemic from the total of 8060 credit institutions of the European Union, 
are prepared to face the potential vulnerabilities. The paper proceeds as 
follows: 1) Literature review. 2) Procedural elements of a stress test. 3) 
Conclusions on the legal question regarding the possibility to draw up a 
stress test in order to highlight the philosophy of Third Basel Accord. 
 
       1. Literature review 
 
Starting with the work of Thomas C. Wilson (Wilson 1997), 
which demonstrated the necessity to measure the credit risk, as additional 
support of the transactional control in adverse economic conditions, 
emerged scientific works treating the stress tests fee ability, in various 
different bank systems, in order to see the way in which they can absorb 
shocks and continue their activity in a sustainable and robust manner.   
Marco Sorge (Sorge 2004, p.165) showed the methodological 
difference between the “single” and “integrated” approach of stress tests 
applied at macro level. Sorge illustrated a clear distinction between the 
evaluations of the system vulnerabilities, mainly based on a single 
indicator – capital adequacy ratio and the non performing credits and the 
probability of potential loss based on a stressing scenario, considering the 
multiple factors which can generate it.  
 Kimmo Virolainen (Virolainen 2004), analyzing the economy 
and the banking sector from Finland, showed the direct relation between 
the corporate credit rate in default and a series of key macroeconomic 
factors as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the company’s 
indebtedness and the interest rate level.  
In order to assure the financial and monetary stability, in 
European system, the Basel Committee established in 1974 as main 
objectives: the minimum capital requirements for banks in order to cover 
risks, as well as the qualitative improvement of the risk management. The 
First Basel Accord was implemented in the year 1998, establishing a 
minimal ratio of 8% equity vs. assets.   
Consequently to Basel I, the Second Basel Accord from 2004 set 
the accent, in three clear and efficient directions based on: the minimum 
capital requirements of each bank according with its risk of economic 
loss, the necessity of effective supervisory review of banks internal 
assessments regarding their own risk and market discipline characterized 
by transparency in bank’s public reporting. More precisely, the three 
main pillars have been the following:  
1. “Minimum Capital Requirements” 
2. “Supervisory Committee” 
3. “Market Discipline”.  
              The “Minimum Capital Requirements” pillar set two new 
bridges: 
 ♦ The first bridge established a higher level of capital for those 
debtors with higher level of credit risk.  
 ♦ The second bridge set up a capital charge for a bank exposure 
to risk of losses generated by internal and own events such as failures in 
process, system and staff, or by external events such as natural disasters.  
              The “Supervisory Committee” pillar established the role of 
supervisors in the process of evaluating the risk profile of an individual 
bank, in order to determine the right level of capital according with the 
requirements in pillar one and to see when there is a need for remedial 
actions.  
              The “Market Discipline” pillar had set the transparency of public 
reporting made by banks in order to offer adequate information’s for all 
the market participants and to allow them to reward those banks that is 
managing prudently their risk and to penalize those whit hazardous 
management. 
The financial crisis that surrounded Europe highlighted the 
necessity to strengthen the risk management in banking sector and also 
the regulation and the supervisory mechanism. In this respect Basel III 
Accord had developed the framework of Basel I and Base II in order to 
strengthen the banking sector capacity to deal with economic and 
financial stress, to improve the banks risk management and assure a total 
transparency of this institutions till 31
st 
March 2018. 
In this respect in 2010 the literature has developed with Basel III 
Accord whose requirements will be treated in the next chapter as a part of 
procedural elements of a stress test. 
 
 
       2. Procedural elements of a stress testing 
 
The national and international authorities which have a control 
and supervision role developed and continue to develop stress tests in 
order to adapt those to a real possible crisis situation, highlighting their 






The objective of these researches became an institutional one 
and consists in the identification and definition of the endogenous and 
exogenous factors which can generate sustainable solutions for 
maintenance of a healthy bank climate in adverse market conditions.  
The existent stress tests approaches three major aspects.   
1. The first aspect is related to the creation and development of 
the inter-relation model between certain economic and financial 
variables.  
2. The second one is related to the calibration of macroeconomic 
and financial parameters with those of the credit parameters.  
3. The third aspect refers to the creation of an adverse economic 
environment and its implications on the credits quality and of the entities 
solvability, which compose the bank system. The macroeconomic 
variables often encountered in the stress tests, in order to measure the 
economic activity type are:  the GDP, the unemployment rate, the current 
account deficit, the exchange rate, the reference interest, the inflation, the 
value of immobile goods.  
                  The manner in which these adverse scenarios can influence 
the portfolios quality and of the bank system solvability is done by the 
application of the two models: “top to bottom” and “bottom to top”.  
1. “Top to bottom” model describes the simulation of the credit 
quality evolution in case of major distress, starting from a series of data 
taken from the economic system.  
2. In case of the model “bottom to top”, the internal data 
supplied by each bank will be analyzed.  
Following the financial crisis, in the Euro Zone member states 
were applied two stress tests - in 2010, 2011. Even if those stress tests 
represented a step forward in order to bond and consolidate the European 
banking system, they did not met the expectations, because it was not 
obtained the increase of the trust sentiment of investors, shareholders and 
of the population in this strategic system.  
The next stress test that will be applied in the Euro Zone will 
take into consideration the financial results reported by 124 banks 
considered systemic, and shall create an adverse scenario afferent to three 
years’ time interval. 
The minimal rate for capital adequacy will be of 8% for the 
baseline scenario and of 5,5 % for the adverse scenario.  The scenario 
will start from a static balance in which it will not be any type of increase 
for both scenarios. At the same time banks obligations and costs from 
P&L point of view shall be analyzed in case these will not register an 
increase and have the same business model.  
               Basel III accord reinforced the Basel II pillars by aligning more 
deep their features into the market, and also increased the role of the 
banks liquidity.                              
The main differences between Basel II and Basel III philosophy 
regarding the “Minimum capital requirements” is: 
♦ Establishing at 10.5 %, from 8 % the minimum ratio, when is 
combined with the conservation buffer. 
♦ Setting at 4, 5% from 2 % the minimum ratio of equity. 
♦ The overall Tier 1 capital requirement - consisting of not only 
common equity but also other qualifying financial instruments, will also 
be raised from 4% to 6%. 
♦ Banks are required to conduct more rigorous test of externally 
rated securisation exposures. 
♦ The trading book – “considerably higher capital for trading and 
derivatives activities”;  
♦ Counterparty credit risk – “substantial strengthening of the 
counterparty credit risk framework”;  
♦ “Trade exposures to a qualifying CCP will receive a 2% risk 
weight and default fund exposures to a qualifying CCP will be 
capitalized according to a risk-based method that consistently and simply 
estimates risk arising from such default fund” (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2010); 
♦ the containing leverage, it will set a non-risk leverage ratio that 
includes off balance sheet exposure as a backstop to the risk-based 
capital requirement.  
The main differences between Basel II and Basel III philosophy 
regarding the “Supervisory Committee” is that Basel III brings in 
addition wide governance, incentives for banks in order to better manage 
risk and returns over long term, valuation practices, accounting 
standards, corporate governance and supervisory institutions.  
In the content of the “Market Discipline” pillar the requirements 
introduced, refers to exposures and sponsorship of off-balance sheet 
vehicles. 
Starting from Basel III philosophy the national surveillance 
authority from every UE member state in close cooperation with the 
European Commission, European Central Bank and International 
Monetary Fund successfully managed to assure a sustainable, well 
capitalized and robust banking system able to sustain further the 
European economy. It was and it is possible because each bank under the 
surveillance of the national authority follows similar approaches. 
1. It is created a delayed economic recovery scenario by 
powerfully stressing the following macroeconomic key indicators: a 
declining GDP, income, residential house prices, commercial real estate 
prices and the increasing of unemployment rate and inflation.  
2. With the implementation of the Assets Quality Review process, 
starting from dynamic definition of troubled assets, the systemic banks 
were or will be soon proper capitalized. It is a great step forward because 
the credit loss policy is at maximum level of stress by considering 
troubled assets also the modified loans, even if they are current. 
3. The CLP’s calculations encompass the entire loan book of 
banking groups, from resident country and abroad. This approach 
considers the loans –secured by collateral located in the residence 
country, carrying the national risk and also the loans carrying the foreign 
risk, from their subsidiaries in other countries. 
4. The capital assessment need is a model conducted for each 
bank starting from their internal reports on the basis of their restructuring 
plans. In this respect by making a credit loss projection and internal 
capital generation starting from the 2013 balance sheet’s over a three or 
four year period, with conservative adjustments, will allow banks time to 
properly fill this resort till the ECB 2014 stress test. 
 In the next chapter I will present a few comments regarding the 
expectations on the 2014 stress test results in order to highlight the 
philosophy of Third Basel Accord. 
 
        3. Conclusions 
 
The 2014 ECB stress test model will regain the confidence and 
trust of the population, investors and as well the bank shareholder’s 
future commitment in the European banking system.  
Applying the Basel III philosophy, the systemic banks from 
Euro Zone acquire a minimum comfort capital adequacy rate, reaching 
the two minimal requirements (5.5% stressed scenario or 8% baseline 
scenario).      
 This is possible because of the close cooperation between the 
national and European supervisory authorities. The national authorities 
are committed to prepare banks to successfully pass the EBA’s 2014 
stress test by considering all the identified risks, by stressing at the 
maximum the potential variables and to implement the measures, in a 
short time. 
In my opinion, the results reported by the national surveillance 
authorities will be different from EBA’s 2014 s tress test only if the EBA 
test will start applying it from a static balance point of view, having in 
mind that all the banks commitments in front of Directorate General 
Competition have been developed under the assumption of a dynamic 
balance. 
               The topic needs further discussions based on the results of 2014 
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